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Abstract
The question of themoral relevance of the individual demand is fundamental tomany purchase
decisions of daily consumer life. Can a single purchase make a difference for the better or
worse? Each individual consumer could argue that companies are unlikely to adjust their
production due to one single item more or less being sold. He might therefore decide not to
change his consumption behavior but instead to rely on the effort of others, a pattern
commonly referred to as collective action problem. In this article, we study collective action
problems with regard to everyday purchase situations. We base our discussion on Shelly
Kagan’s famous article “Do Imake a difference?” and critically discuss a central assumption of
his model: the symmetric relationship between supply and demand. We find that Kagan’s
solution to collective action problems is not true a priori but has to be evaluated in certain
empirical surroundings.We therefore discuss the approach in the context of the Europeanmeat
market and demonstrate that Kagan’s argument does not provide a universal solution to cases
of meat purchasing. We conclude with an outlook regarding the role of consumer ethics.
Keywords Collective action . Consequentialism . Expected utility . Consumer ethics . Meat
consumption
Do I Make a Difference?
We are living in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world — a development that
alters not only our habits of living and communicating but also our consumption behavior.
Consider an everyday purchase situation like grocery shopping in a supermarket. Due to global
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value chains, a broad range of products is available at remarkably affordable prices. While the
individual consumer benefits from this convenience, he is probably aware of the downsides
associated with global value chains such as unsustainable production practices, animal suffer-
ing and worker exploitation.
The avoidance of such negative repercussions constitutes a goal that perhaps can be
achieved if a sufficient number of people collaborate by changing their purchasing habits.
Companies might react to changes in large-scale consumption patterns and consumer prefer-
ences, which can be made plausible by the rise of the fair trade movement or by successful
consumer boycotts (O’Rourke 2012). Each individual consumer, however, might decide not to
change anything and instead to rely on the efforts of others. He could argue that companies are
unlikely to adjust their production due to one single item more or less being sold, so that his
purchase doesn’t make any difference.
The aforementioned scenario constitutes a so-called problem of collective action (see e.g.
Taylor 1987) or collective harm case (Nefsky 2015): on an individual level, a single act does
not seem to make much of a difference, yet on a collective level accumulated actions result in
harm to others — be it to people or to animals.
In this article, we study problems of collective action in the context of purchase situations. With
my purchase, can I make any difference for the better or worse? Am I morally obliged to abstain
from certain purchases? This article’s research question Q can be precisely articulated as follows:
Q: Is it possible that many purchase actions together make a difference in terms of
welfare, but no single purchase action makes any (positive or negative) difference in
terms of welfare?
To study Q, we will refer to consequentialism as a normative framework. Consequentialism
evaluates actions on the basis of their consequences. Problems of collective action as described in Q
pose a fundamental challenge to a consequentialist rationale — that makes consequentialism
interesting as a framework for our research (further arguments for our choice of consequentialism:
Gesang 2005). If a single action does not bear any negative consequences or no consequences at all,
act-consequentialism cannot morally condemn the action as illustrated by Shelly Kagan:
For if there are indeed cases that have this sort of structure (… ) then consequentialism
appears to fail even in its own favored terrain, where we are concerned with conse-
quences ( … ). Intuitively ( … ) the acts in question need to be condemned because of
the results that eventuate from everyone’s performing them. ( … ) Yet despite this, it
seems as though the consequentialist simply isn’t in a position to condemn the relevant
acts (… ) The problem, in effect, is this: consequentialism condemns my act only when
my act makes a difference. But in the kind of cases we are imagining, my act makes no
difference. (Kagan 2011).
In the following, we will first of all summarize Shelly Kagan’s solution approach to the
aforementioned problem because it is the best consequentialist approach known to us,
following a broad tradition (compare: Singer 1980; Parfit 1987; Matheny 2002). Kagan
provides a positive answer to Q by performing an expected utility analysis which yields a
negative expected utility for the single meat purchase. He concludes that each purchase can
make a difference for the worse and thus can be condemned by a consequentialist rationale.
Having outlined Kagan’s line of argument, we then reveal the underlying assumptions of his
model, such as a symmetric relation between supply and demand. Finally, we provide a
detailed analysis of the European meat industry and find that Kagan’s argument does not
provide a universal solution to all cases of meat purchasing.
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Solution Approach: S. Kagan
Philosopher Shelly Kagan has recently actualized a tradition that aims to provide a standard-
solution to the aforementioned problem of consequentialism and collective action (Singer
1980; Parfit 1987; Matheny 2002). In his article “Do I Make a Difference?” he argues that all
collective action problems inherit a single (or several) threshold(s). Before this threshold is
reached, several individual acts may occur without producing any harm. Once the threshold
has been reached, a single additional action triggers the harmful result. It therefore holds true
that while “most acts make no difference, [...] some single act makes a great deal of difference”
(Kagan 2011). Kagan refers to such cases as triggering cases.
In order to illustrate a triggering case in daily consumption choices, Kagan uses the example of
purchasing chicken. He assumes that chickens are raised and slaughtered on a chicken farm before
they are delivered to the butcher’s counter of a supermarket. At first sight, the purchase of an
individual chicken does not seem to make any difference. The chicken is already dead when it
arrives at the supermarket; thus the harm has already been created and cannot be attributed to the act
of purchasing. Nevertheless, a single chicken purchase might trigger the order (and therefore the
death) of new chickens. InKagan’s scenario, the supermarket does not order a new chicken for every
chicken sold. Instead, it orders in fixed cycles: once Tchickens have been sold, Tadditional chickens
are reordered. The chicken farm reacts to the supermarket’s order; i.e. it kills the corresponding
number of chickens and hatches T new eggs. The scenario resembles a triggering case in which
every Tth purchase constitutes a triggering action. If T equals 25, for instance, then the 25th, 50th,
75th etc. chicken purchase will each trigger the death of 25 chickens.
For his analysis, Kagan focuses on the cohort size, i.e. the number of people buying
chickens (assumption: 1 chicken per person) at a given store on a particular day. Here, two
scenarios can be distinguished:
I) The cohort size is equal to T (or a multiple of T)
If exactly T (or 2T, 3T etc.) chickens have been sold, each chicken purchase can be directly
linked to the harm associated with the death of the chickens. If one consumer had not made a
purchase, the threshold of T would not have been reached, and thus no additional T chickens
would have been ordered and killed. As this holds true for each individual consumer, it can be
concluded that each purchase makes a morally relevant difference.
II) The cohort size is not equal to T (or a multiple of T)
In this scenario, the individual purchase can no longer be related to the death of the chickens.
Even if a single consumer had refrained from his purchase, still the same number of chickens
would have been ordered and killed.
The individual consumer does not know the size of his cohort and thus has no idea whether
he is facing scenario I or II. In order to account for this problem, Kagan uses the concept of
expected utility (EUT). The EUT is the sum of the utilities of outcomes of an act multiplied by
the respective probabilities that these outcomes will become real (Briggs 2016):
EUT =∑ [Utility (Outcomei) * Probabilityi].
In relation to the chicken example, the (positive) utility associated with the purchase
consists in the pleasure that can be derived from consuming the chicken. The death of the
chicken constitutes a disutility that needs to be considered as well.
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EUT one chicken = Expected Pleasure (EP) - Expected Harm (EH).
Kagan assumes the harm created by the killing of the chicken to be greater than the pleasure
derived from its consumption. Having made those assumptions, the EUT of buying a chicken
can now be calculated as follows:
In any case, the pleasure (EP) associated with the purchase equals the consumption of one
chicken. The harm related to the purchase depends on the size of the cohort the consumer is
part of. If the cohort size equals (a multiple of) T (scenario I), the purchase is associated with
the death of T additional chickens. If not (scenario II), no harm can be attributed to the
purchase. While the former is relatively unlikely (corresponding probability 1T), the latter is by
far the more probable scenario (corresponding probability T−1T ). Both scenarios need to be taken
into account when calculating EH. As indicated in the calculation, it turns out that EH consists
of exactly one dead chicken.
In a final step, EP can be offset against EH. As the pleasure of consuming the chicken does
not outweigh the harm created by the killing (per assumption), the EUT will doubtlessly be
negative.
EUTPurchase ¼ EPPurchase−EHPurchase j given EPPurchase < EHPurchaseð Þ:
EUTPurchase < 0:
Kagan concludes that not buying the chicken constitutes the superior alternative compared to
buying it.
All in all, Kagan provides a positive answer to Q: All problems that emerge from collective
buying patterns inherit a threshold which can be crossed by a single purchase. Crossing the
threshold induces the production of additional products (chickens, sweatshirts etc.) and thus
the creation of additional product-related harm. Even though the consumer does not know
whether his particular purchase will actually trigger new production (or more precisely:
whether he is part of a cohort of the relevant size), he knows that this could be the case.
Overall, it is the possibility of causing harm that yields a negative EUT and thereby makes the
purchase compared to not buying morally unacceptable.
The Symmetry Thesis
In Kagan’s argument, the Tth purchase triggers the order (and thereby the production) of
additional T products. For each individual customer, the probability of setting off the trigger is
1
T while the maximum amount of harm generated by the triggering action is exactly T. If T is,
for instance, 10, each individual has a 110 chance to be responsible for the death of 10 additional
chickens. If Tis equal to 1000, on the contrary, the chance of setting off the trigger is 11;000 and
the associated harm would consist in the death of 1000 additional chickens. Note that if T
increases [decreases], the probability of setting off the trigger becomes smaller [larger], while
the harm associated with the triggering action increases [decreases] (see also Fig. 1). For each
individual action, the probability of setting off the trigger moves in inverse proportion to the
amount of harm that can potentially be caused by this action (Matheny 2002). This relation is a
key feature of Kagan’s argument and is also referred to as the “symmetry thesis” (Gesang
2017). The symmetry thesis has a substantial impact on the EUT calculation: due to the
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relationship between the triggering number and the caused harm, T is canceled out in the
calculation (as it appears in both the numerator and denominator) and thus the EUT remains
constant, independently of the actual value of T.
A critique of the symmetry thesis is also offered by Julia Nefsky: “There is no guarantee
that the expected utility will come out negative in every triggering case. Whether it does or not
depends on the probabilities and on the goodness and badness of the relevant consequences.”
(Nefsky 2012; cf. Harris and Galvin 2012). One of the present authors has shown that the
symmetry thesis fails in context of climate ethics (Gesang 2017).
Kagan defends his points empirically by the symmetry thesis. In addition he gives an a priori
argument, which one of the authors discusses in detail elsewhere (Gesang 2017). A short overview
may be helpful: Let us beginwith Parfits harmless torturer problem. In the harmless torturer case it is
questionable whether it is morally right to be one of a thousand persons who, by pressing a button,
makes a very small contribution to increasing the electrical voltage to which another person is being
subjected and which, when viewed overall, causes this person great pain. But here the steps of each
individual voltage increase should remain imperceptible to the sacrificed person. My pressing of the
button does not cause any altered perception of pain in comparison to the amount of measured
voltage caused by my predecessor (Parfit 1987).
But in comparison with the initial and final states of all individual contributions combined,
there is a great difference in the degree of suffering. How can the difference between 0 and
1000 be so grave when all intermediate steps are harmless? Kagan believes that such cases do
not exist (Kagan 2011). But that means that you can solve the problem of the sorites paradoxon
which is here implicated (cf. Hyde 2018) easily in one direction. J. Nefsky offers a solution
according to which the small increase in voltage caused by a protagonist in the example is not
sufficient for leading to different perceptions of suffering. A minimal increase in voltage is
simply not the right unit for causing perceptible suffering; just as in the Sorites problem, the
grain of sand does not turn the heap into a hill (Nefsky 2012; cf. Wright 1975). So Kagans a
Fig. 1 Symmetry thesis: disproportional relation between probability of triggering and caused harm
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priori point might not work - there exist alternatives. For Kagan remains the empirical
symmetry thesis.
It becomes obvious that we need to take a closer look at how Kagan defends symmetry as
actually prevailing in reality. Kagan justifies his symmetry assumption by referring to a
supply-demand relationship. With regard to his example, he emphasizes that the butcher
“adjusts his order to keep up with demand.” (Kagan 2011). Furthermore, the butcher “neither
wants to fall behind demand nor end up with larger numbers of unsold rotting chickens.”
(Kagan 2011). Kagan therefore concludes that “the number of chickens he [the butcher] orders
is more or less the same as the number of purchases required before a new order is triggered.”
(Kagan 2011). Or, stated differently: supply will be more or less equal to demand.
In his line of argument, Kagan does not refer to any concepts from business or economics
but instead introduces his scenario with the statement “presumably, it works something like
this […]. ” (Kagan 2011). To us, this procedure is not convincing inasmuch as it lacks a solid
foundation. In the following, we therefore want to shift perspectives and analyze Kagan’s
scenario from the viewpoint of business studies and economics.
Supply and Demand
In economic theory, supply and demand are the key forces at work in a market economy. The
relationship between supply and demand determines prices in the economy, and thus ultimate-
ly the allocation of resources. If the supply is greater than the demand (and vice versa), there is
a pressure on the price to change. Assume, for example, that the demand for a product
suddenly drops. Supply will then be greater than demand and the price of the product will
drop as well. At a lower price, more people will be willing to buy the product; i.e., demand
increases again. At some point, there will be a price that balances supply and demand, a
situation commonly referred to as market equilibrium (Mankiw and Taylor 2014).
Based on the law of supply and demand, can we assume that companies will automatically
adjust their supply once they experience a change in demand?Not necessarily. First of all, we need
to narrow down a time frame to be considered in our analysis. The question as to whether (and if
so, how) individual demand affects supply is also a matter of time. In economic theory, two
different conceptual time periods can be distinguished: the short term and the long run. The
distinction between the different time periods bears direct relevance for a producer’s supply
decisions: In the short term, some factors of production1 are fixed and therefore cannot be
changed (Mankiw and Taylor 2014). A production plant’s capacity, for instance, is fixed and
cannot be increased from one day to another. Consequently, if a company detects an increase in
demand, it might not be able to increase its production levels accordingly in the short run.
Similarly, if there is a drop in demand, the company might not be able to immediately cut back
production as well. In the long run, all factors of production can be altered (Mankiw and Taylor
2014). Consequently, a firm is more flexible regarding its supply-related decisions in the long run.
It could, for example, decide to open a new plant as a consequence of increased demand or to look
for geographically new markets as a reaction to a drop in demand. In relation to Q it is therefore
important to specify the time frame at issue. While a change in demand will probably not affect
production levels in the short term, it might indeed in the long run.
1 Factors of production are the resources or inputs needed in order to produce output, i.e. goods and services.
Land, labor and capital constitute the most basic factors of production (Mankiw and Taylor 2014).
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The Common Agricultural Policy
To estimate long-term influences in Kagan’s example, we need to consider the fact that the
industry chosen by Kagan (the meat industry) is a very specific one. Meat is an agricultural
product and is as such subject to a variety of political rules and regulations. These rules and
regulations, in turn, depend on the geographic location of the corresponding market and differ
significantly from country to country. In the following, we will focus on the particularities of
the meat industry within the European Union.2 Literature has been emphasizing for decades
the strong political influence that the European Union exerts on the agricultural production of
such products as meat (Henrichsmeyer and Witzke 1991).
In the 1980s, for instance, it was common to systematically subsidize meat production in the EU
with up to 15 billion euros annually. (http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/agrarsubventionen-
der-eu-werden-viel-zu-spaet-abgeschafft-a-944019.html). In 2014, direct subsidies related to meat
production in the EU were finally abolished (with the exception of France, Austria and Denmark)
(http://www.bauernverband.de/43-gemeinsameagrarpolitik-gap-erste-saeule). As of now, there are
still somemeasures of state support in place (e.g. theVATreduction formeat inGermany), yet with a
significantly lower impact.
However, the decisive aspect in this regard is the fact that meat subsidies have been
abolished because they were no longer required by the meat industry. Former EU minister
of agriculture Dacian Ciolos has pointed to the fact that at some point, industry characteristics
might change again such that the decision might be reversed (https://info.brot-fuer-die-welt.
de/blog/exportsubventionen-afrika-sind-nicht-abgeschafft; https://germanwatch.org/de/9079).
We therefore conclude that meat subsidies have currently been paused rather than
irreversibly abolished.
This producer-friendly attitude also reflects the official definition of EU agricultural policy as a
whole: in order to organize agricultural policy within the EU, member states have agreed on a so-
called Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which steers and regulates the supply of agricultural
products. The goal of the CAP is to ensure “a decent standard of living for farmers, at the same time
as setting requirements for animal health and welfare, environmental protection and food safety.”
(https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-overview_en) In relation to our research questionQ, the CAP is
a relevant factor to be considered in our analysis. The steering force of the CAP alters the rules of the
game and substantially impacts upon farmers’ production-related decisions (e.g. what / how / how
much to produce). All in all, the subsidies and governmental support measures related to the meat
industry serve as a “safety net” that makes producers less vulnerable to fluctuations in demand. In
the event of crises, some sort of governmental interference can be expected.
Whether this influence is long- or short-term depends on how long these political “market
distortions” are maintained. What we see is that market distortions have been present for quite
a while. In addition, lobbying continues to shape decisions related to agricultural policy. As a
consequence, a single purchase is unlikely to have an effect on production levels in the
industry. As long as these distortions are present, there is no need to balance supply and
demand, which would be necessary in order to influence small fluctuations in demand such as
those caused by individual buying.
It is therefore wrong to establish correlations between supply and demand that disregard
this aspect. Thus, there is the thesis of Norwood and Lusk that through the renunciation of any
2 As compared to Kagan, who probably would have chosen the American meat industry for any empirical proofs;
this, however, does not affect the point we are trying to make in the following section.
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one egg, the total production will drop by 0.91 eggs. Similarly, not consuming one kg of beef
will lead to 0.68 kg less beef being produced (Norwood and Lusk 2011): “In reality if Frank
eats one more chicken, total chicken consumption will increase by slightly less than one
chicken. As Frank demands more chicken the price will slightly rise, inducing others to eat
less.” (Norwood and Lusk 2011). However, Norwood and Lusk only take into consideration
the relationships among supply, stock, demand and price: “The impact of a single individual’s
choice, however, is complex. The effect of abstaining from eating poultry on the number of
animals raised for chicken meat depends on the size of the population of farm animals and on
the supply and demand for chicken.” (Norwood and Lusk 2011). Just as is the case with
Kagan, Norwood and Lusk do not include institutions that can potentially compensate for
demand shortages in their analysis.
Even though state intervention might play an important role, it does not totally level off the
relevance of demand for meat. Finally, demand plays a role in determining which laws and
regulations are kept in place. Assume there was a sudden drop in demand: the more severe this
drop is in terms of scope and duration, the more expensive state assistance will be. At some
point, states might no longer be able to compensate for the full drop in demand, so that
production levels would finally decrease. Whether this would actually happen would mainly
depend on power-political calculations. There might be a party A representing the interests of
farmers. This party would probably defend state aid regardless of the costs associated with the
measures. Party B, on the other hand, aims at stopping state aid no matter how severe potential
demand crises might be. Whether party A or B dominates in the end does not depend on any
triggering points or thresholds, but on power politics. But it could also be different, so that
current demand figures are important arguments. Overall, those mechanisms are very difficult
to anticipate and it is certainly not possible to calculate them in the form of an expected utility
analysis.
In order to make a targeted decision, an empirical evaluation must therefore be carried out
regarding the extent to which demand has an impact on a specific product and how strong the
lobby is that protects this product. In each case, a check has to be made as to whether the
producer’s reaction is so “fine-grained” that every single purchase counts, at least as one that
may possibly (given the current political constellations) exceed or fall below a threshold
value.3 In view of the fact that such complex mechanisms based on many players are involved,
the prognosis is not self-evident— and sometimes unlikely— that a single purchase can have
an effect. In any case, Kagan’s a priori suppression of market specifics must be questioned, and
that is our main finding. Each product has different dimensions and is to be examined
separately for its demand elasticity. What follows from this is that not every single meat
purchase really has an impact on the number of animals raised and killed in total. The
relationships among CAP, political powers and markets have to be taken into consideration.
Conclusions and Outlook
1. Kagan’s argument is convincing if (and only if) we are facing a market in which supply
and demand balance each other.
2. Supply and demand balance each other in a market where the symmetry thesis is met.
3 For example, it is also possible to respond to slumps in demand with marketing or the search for new sales
markets.
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3. In the EU meat market, the symmetry thesis is not met because of political regulations and
ensuing conclusions drawn by the producers.
4. In the EU meat market, we encounter a market in which supply and demand do not
balance each other.
C. Kagan’s argument is not convincing for the EU meat market.
One must give a negative answer to Q.
In a final remark, a brief outlook on conscious consumer behavior as a driver of economic
change is to be given. As a consequence of this work, one could think that it is infinitely
difficult to make the right decisions here, so that one would rather not commit oneself at all.
This conclusion is a fallacy. In fact, it is difficult to decide whether and when an individual
purchase has a positive effect. This effect can often be achieved more effectively by donating
to charities the money that could be used for the conscious consumption of alternative products
(cf. MacAskill 2015). Donations have the advantage that an individual action can also help
without collective cooperation and thus have a direct effect compared to ethical consumption.
Conscious consumption makes a positive difference to the world only if enough consumers
participate. In contrast, a donation to an effective charity can make a difference in terms of
welfare, no matter how many people participate., for example it can bring it about that a person
is cured from blindness. Those who have spare resources should therefore donate their money
to effective charities instead of spending it on more expensive consumption. Donations to
charity even make it possible to combine sure welfare gains with possible successes of
collective actions. For example, if I secure the livelihood of small farmers in the rain forest,
I directly help these farmers. In addition, I prevent them from selling their (or their commu-
nities) land to large corporations that would destroy the rain forest. I thereby help protecting
species diversity and I may help fight climate change, provided that a sufficient number of
small farmers receives that kind of support.
In some cases, though, my cooperation in conscious consumption is costless to me or I can
make welfare gains with it. If so, I should cooperate. For example, it doesn’t make a difference
for me whether I install Google or Ecosia (a search engine that uses its revenues from
advertisement for reforestation) on my computer, but it does make a difference to the world.
Thus, the above result about the partial powerlessness of the individual consumer is
exploited constructively. It does not lead us to conclude from a lack of influence that we
cannot change anything and must therefore maintain the status quo. Rather, it serves as an
indication that resources can be used more effectively in other places than for individual
consumption (MacAskill 2015; about problems with this see Budolfson and Spears 2019). One
could also conclude, of course, that the whole argumentation shows that consequentialism fails
as a framework, since it does not prohibit what is evidently forbidden. Other models (Kutz
2000; Schwartz 2017) might be more useful for consumer ethics. This fundamental decision
exceeds the scope of this paper.
Another reaction to the findings presented is to not focus on one’s own purchasing
behavior, but on the political commitment of the citizens (Maltais 2013). This is certainly a
possible reaction to the situation described, but it is a difficult task to demonstrate that the
individual is more influential as a political actor or voter than as a consumer (Downs 1957).
This project also goes beyond our chosen perspective (see Gesang 2020).
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